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1. Much of the enthusiasm which might have greeted a triumphal return of Bao Dai was lost as a consequence of the fact that the ex-Emperor has spent most of his time in the resort city of Dalat and remained there for some time prior to making his first tour around the country. There have been similar delays in implementation of almost all the plans connected with the granting of independence to Viet Nam. There was considerable confusion in the choosing of a cabinet. Bao Dai at different times during May and June asked various men of stature in all three provinces to come to Dalat for purposes of discussion. While some accepted the invitation, it was declined by several. Most of this was unofficial and not given press publicity. Of those who went to Dalat, not all were willing to participate in the formation of the new government. Among the men who refused on the grounds that "the circumstances did not require their presence" were Nguyen Xuan Chu, a former member of the Ho Chi Minh government, and Tran Van Lai, Mayor of Hanoi at the time of the Kim Government (March-August 1945). The actual reasons for their refusal were threefold, and about as might have been expected: (a) prevailing feeling of French insincerity; (b) lack of confidence in Bao Dai's ability to handle the French advantageously and to organize a representative government; and (c) possible fear of ultimate Viet Minh reprisal in the event of Bao Dai's failure. After the relative lack of success in getting people to visit Dalat, Prince Bui Loc made equally abortive trips to various parts of the country in an effort to secure the cooperation of certain individuals.
2. The general opinion of the Vietnamese population on the capabilities of the individuals finally named to the first Bao Dai Government cabinet can be summed up in the words "it doesn't amount to much." This opinion is shared by the majority of French residents. However, and this applies to the public above the peasant level, there has been all along the hope that Bao Dai can successfully press the French for great concessions, virtually amounting to complete freedom. Because of the general belief that French political generosity will vary inversely with French military success,

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there is at the same time the hope that the Viet Minh will not collapse, thereby enabling the French to dictate the terms of independence.

3. There was not much progress made during the summer months along political lines or in the implementation of the Accords signed by Bao Dai and President Auriol. There was, however, considerable talk, particularly on the part of the Vietnamese press which generally reflects a bitter and unrealistic attitude. The Vietnamese newspapers have not, for the most part, taken any sort of a constructive stand concerning the political issues facing Viet Nam. The French press, at the same time, has not been much more realistic, implying in its articles that the French Government has already made great progress in handing over various functions to the Bao Dai Government. The Minister for Overseas France in the Quesselle Government, M. Coste-Floret, arrived in Hanoi during the second week in August and made numerous speeches consisting of the usual cliches about what the French Government had done and was going to do for Indochina. By his rude manner, Coste-Floret succeeded in antagonizing most of the Vietnamese with whom he came in contact.
4. Much has been made, both in the press and among the local population, of the admission of the Bao Dai Government representatives as associate members of the October ECAFE conference in Singapore, especially in view of the simultaneous non-recognition of the Ho Chi Minh Government delegation. This event engendered general encouragement which received an added and tremendous spurt by the visit of Malcolm MacDonald, the British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia. This attention on the part of the British Government is interpreted, in spite of denials, as significant of the imminence of recognition of the Bao Dai Government by the British. Great significance is attributed by all residents of the area, although the French to a lesser degree than the Vietnamese, to the visit of almost any foreign official for whatever stated reason. Such visits are usually unanimously misinterpreted by both the government and the intellectuals.
5. India occupies considerable attention in the minds of everyone in government circles in Hanoi. The published report of the Indian Consul General in Saigon excited the French almost to a frenzy. The report that Nehru would intervene among Bao Dai, the French, and Ho Chi Minh brought forth cheers from the Vietnamese. The nationalistic attitude of Indian representatives in Indochina is extremely evident and their occasionally expressed feelings are just another drop of fuel on the flame already existing.
6. Nguyen Huu Tri, Bao Dai Government Governor of Tonkin, is one of the best men the country has to offer. He was Chef de Province at Thai Binh during the Kim Government (March-August 1945) and has been identified with politics, used in its better sense, for a comparatively long time. Since he became Governor there have been a number of decrees beneficial to the people, including an amelioration of the rice situation, and he has prosecuted some of the functionaries whose flagrant misdeeds have hitherto escaped censure.

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